Death On the Highway: Part IV: Fall of 1864.

After a respite to resupply and rearm, the next attempt by the Army of the Potomac of the United States to reach and take possession of the Confederate supply lines leading to the city of Petersburg came on September 30-October 2, 1864.  The Confederates also used this time to lengthen their right flank and to build new strong entrenchments to the southwest of Petersburg and to shuffle their troops around, having guessed the likely Union moves. On September 30, the strong Union V Corps, commanded by Major General Gouverneur Kemble Warren, moved out of its portion of the fortifications and maneuvered to its left. In a series of battles (variously known as the battle of Poplar Springs Church, the battle of the Harman Road, the battle of Jones’s farm, the battle of Pegram’s farm, the battle of the Vaughan Road, the battle of the Squirrel Level Road, and the battle of Peebles’s farm), the Army of the Potomac broke through an advanced fortified position and captured a fortification (Fort Archer) along the Squirrel Level Road; in its attack past those advanced entrenchments, the United States forces nearly reached the Boydton Plank Road (Route 1.)  However, the offensive failed in its main objective to break completely around the Confederate main right flank and to secure possession of the Boydton Plank Road (Route 1).  Even though the Union V Corps again sustained twice as many casualties as its outnumbered opponent, the Confederate Third Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill (and, in his absence, Major General Henry Heth), the V Corps was able to hold onto its hard-fought gains; the United States entrenched line was once again lengthened to secure the newly-captured area and new fortifications and redoubts were constructed on and around the former Fort Archer. The final major offensive of 1864 by the Army of the Potomac occurred on October 27-28, 1864 and it took direct aim at capturing and shutting down the Southside Railroad. This time the principal labor fell to the Union II Corps, commanded by Major General Winfield Scott Hancock (in his last combat command before his retirement from active campaigning caused by complications from a wound sustained at the battle of Gettysburg the summer before.). Joining the II Corps in supporting roles in the offensive were portions of the V Corps (MG Warren), the IX Corps, commanded by Major General John G. Parke, and the Union cavalry, commanded by Major General David McMurtrie Gregg (in his last combat appearance before his resignation from the Army for unexplained reasons.)  The Union II Corps left the fortified defensive line and moved southwest by the Vaughan Road (now VA 675), then west by the Dabney’s Mill Road (now VA 613), to sever the Boydton Plank Road (Route 1) near its connection with the White Oak Road (now VA 613) and north to the area of Burgess’s Mill on Hatcher’s Run. A seesaw battle (known variously as the battle of the Boydton Plank Road, the battle of Burgess’s Mill, and the First battle of Hatcher’s Run) ensued when the Union soldiers ran into Confederate fortifications and redoubts at the site of the Burgess Tavern and Burgess’s Mill on the Boydton Plank Road (Route 1) and were bloodily thrown back. Confederate soldiers of the Third Corps left their entrenchments and counterattacked, nearly surrounding the Union II Corps.  In turn, the southern soldiers were rebuffed in their efforts to destroy the II Corps, by United States counterattacks which almost surrounded the out-numbered troops of the Confederate Third Corps. By the end of October 28th, the Confederate soldiers were able to return to their powerful fortifications without further loss.  Part of the Boydton Plank Road (Route 1), however, remained in the hands of the Union II Corps. Because of the advanced position of his now-weakened troops and the lack of nearby support in the event of a more powerful counterattack, MG Hancock opted to abandon his foothold on the road and the gains he had made in this seesaw contest and marched his soldiers back to the Union fortified line. Afterwards both armies went into winter camps: few major troop movements and fighting were typically started in winter weather because of the deterioration caused by the inclement weather to the mainly unimproved roads and lanes used for travel. The Confederates continued to use the Boydton Plank Road (Route 1) through the winter of 1864-1865, because of its superior surface. In Part V, I will describe the campaigning in the early spring of 1865, when the United States Army of the Potomac resumed the offensive on the Petersburg front.

In Part V, I will discuss the fighting in the Spring of 1865.